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OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Persil Mangeur LLC, (“Persil”), the Trustee of the 
Liquidation Trust established in debtor Philadelphia 
Entertainment and Development Partners, LP’s (“PEDP”), 
Chapter 11 plan, appeals from a District Court order affirming a 
Bankruptcy Court order dismissing PEDP’s adversary complaint 
against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Revenue 
(together “Commonwealth”).  We trace this case to 2006 when 
the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board (the “Board”) awarded 
a slot machine license to PEDP, which paid a $50 million fee to 
the Commonwealth for the license.  The Board, however, 
eventually revoked the license when PEDP failed to meet certain 
of its requirements for its maintenance.  PEDP unsuccessfully 
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appealed from the revocation order to the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court, following which the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania denied PEDP’s application to review that decision. 
 After the Pennsylvania courts upheld the revocation, 
thereby exhausting PEDP’s remedies through state procedures to 
challenge the revocation, it filed a petition in bankruptcy.  
During the bankruptcy proceedings, it brought an adversary 
action against the Commonwealth alleging that the license 
revocation should be avoided because it was a fraudulent 
transfer under §§ 544 and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code and 
under Pennsylvania law.  Citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, 
the Bankruptcy Court concluded that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over the fraudulent transfer claims in light of the 
proceedings in the state courts which had upheld the revocation 
order.  By that time Persil had been appointed Trustee, and it 
appealed to the District Court which affirmed the Bankruptcy 
Court order.  Persil then appealed to this Court.  We will reverse 
because the Bankruptcy Court erred when it held that the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred its review of the fraudulent 
transfer claims.  We are satisfied that in a review of those claims 
the Bankruptcy Court did not need to review or reject the 
Commonwealth Court’s judgment.  We, however, do not reach a 
conclusion on the question of whether any of PEDP’s fraudulent 
transfer claims are meritorious, so our opinion should not be 
overread as we only address the Rooker-Feldman issue. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 The Pennsylvania Horse Racing Development and 
Gaming Act (the “Gaming Act”), provides for slot machine 
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gaming in Pennsylvania.  4 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1102 (2010).  The 
Gaming Act authorizes the Board to issue two slot machine 
licenses for standalone gaming facilities in Philadelphia.  Id. § 
1304(b).  As a condition for being granted a license, an 
applicant must pay a one-time license fee of $50 million to the 
Commonwealth.  Id. § 1209(a).   
 In December 2006, the Board awarded a slot machine 
license to PEDP.   App’x 107 ¶ 14.  PEDP paid the $50 million 
fee in October 2007, and the Board issued the license the next 
year.  App’x 108 ¶¶ 19-22.  The Board required PEDP to open 
its facility and commence operations by May 2009, but PEDP 
did not meet this deadline and has never opened the facility.  
App’x 109 ¶¶ 23-24.  Nevertheless, the Board extended the 
deadline for opening the facility to May 2011, provided that 
PEDP satisfy nine conditions that the Board required it to meet 
at preset dates during the extension period, App’x 109-10 ¶¶ 25-
29.  These conditions included requirements that PEDP submit 
financial and architectural documents and development plans to 
the Board.  App’x 110 ¶ 29.  PEDP did not satisfy these 
conditions and unsuccessfully sought another extension to 
satisfy the requirements for the license.  App’x 110-12 ¶¶ 30-41. 
 In December 2010, the Board entered an order revoking 
PEDP’s slot machine license by reason of PEDP’s failure to 
follow Board orders and demonstrate its financial suitability.  
App’x 113 ¶ 42, 116 ¶ 60. 
 PEDP appealed from the revocation order to the 
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.  PEDP argued in the 
Commonwealth Court that the Board applied the wrong test for 
determining its financial suitability, the financial suitability 
requirements were unconstitutionally vague, and the Board 
denied PEDP due process of law for several reasons, one of 
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which was a contention that forfeiture of the license for which 
PEDP had paid a $50 million fee was an excessive sanction to 
impose by reason of its failures to satisfy the Board’s 
requirements.  App’x 851-52, 914-15.   The Commonwealth 
Court rejected PEDP’s appeal and affirmed the Board’s 
revocation decision as it concluded that the Board had authority 
under the Gaming Act to revoke the license, the Board used the 
appropriate test under the Gaming Act in reaching its decision, 
the requirements to show financial suitability were clear, and the 
Board afforded PEDP due process because, among other things, 
the revocation was not an unreasonably harsh sanction for 
PEDP’s failure to satisfy the conditions for the license.  Phila. 
Entm’t & Dev. Partners, LP v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 34 A.3d 
261, 268-80 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011).  The Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania denied PEDP’s petition for allowance of appeal 
from the Commonwealth Court’s decision on March 29, 2012.  
Phila. Entm’t & Dev. Partners, LP v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 
41 A.3d 852 (Pa. 2012).   
 Two years later, on March 31, 2014, PEDP filed a 
petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, App’x 17, and then, two months after it filed the petition, 
it filed its adversary complaint against the Commonwealth.  
App’x 103.  This appeal now before us centers on counts Two to 
Four of the adversary complaint.  In Counts Two and Three, 
PEDP asserted claims to avoid what it claimed was a 
constructively fraudulent transfer under 11 U.S.C. §§ 
548(a)(1)(B) and 544(b) and under Pennsylvania’s Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act (“PUFTA”), 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 5101 
et seq.1  Specifically, PEDP claimed that the “revocation of the 
                                                 
1 Sections 548(a)(1)(B) and 544(b) deal with avoidance of 
fraudulent transfers.  Section 548(a)(1)(B) provides that  
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License was a transfer for which [PEDP] received no value from 
the Commonwealth. . . .”  App’x 123 ¶ 97.  Thus, in Count Four, 
PEDP sought recovery of what it claimed was a fraudulent 
transfer under 11 U.S.C. §§ 550 and 551.  PEDP sought to avoid 
the transfer and recover payment from the Commonwealth of 
the full value of the transfer, which PEDP estimated to be $50 
million, the amount of the license fee it had paid.  App’x 123 ¶¶ 
                                                                                                             
 
[t]he Trustee may avoid any transfer . . . of an interest of 
the debtor in property, or any obligation . . . that was 
made or incurred on or within 2 years before the date of 
the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or 
involuntarily … 
 
(B)(i) received less than a reasonably equivalent 
value in exchange for such transfer or obligation; 
and 
 
(ii)(I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer 
was made or such obligation was incurred, or 
became insolvent as a result of such transfer or 
obligation . . . . 
 
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B).   
 
 Section 544(b) permits a trustee to pursue avoidance 
claims under state law—here, the PUFTA.  11 U.S.C. § 544(b).  
The main constructive fraud provisions of the PUFTA, §§ 5104 
and 5105, are similar to constructive fraud under § 548(a)(1)(B), 
except that the PUFTA increases the statutory “look back” 
period from two years to four years.  12 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5109.  
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96-104, 125 ¶ 114.   
 PEDP also asserted separate claims for turnover of the 
amount of the license fee that the Commonwealth did not return 
(Count One), for an unconstitutional taking (Count Five), and on 
theories that the Commonwealth had been unjustly enriched and 
PEDP was entitled to a recovery on the basis of promissory 
estoppel (Counts Six and Seven).  We, however, are not 
concerned with counts One, Five, Six, and Seven on this appeal 
as their dismissal is not presently challenged. 
 In July 2014, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed PEDP’s 
liquidation plan, which called for the creation of a liquidation 
trust supervised by Persil.  App’x 17-18.  Persil as Trustee 
succeeded to all claims belonging to PEDP.  App’x 3; First 
Modified Chapter 11 Liquidation Plan 21-22, In re Phila. Entm’t 
& Dev. Partners, LP, No. 14-12482, ECF No. 88 (Bankr. E.D. 
Pa. May 27, 2014). 
 On April 8, 2016, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed the 
adversary complaint.  In re Phila. Entm’t & Dev. Partners, LP, 
549 B.R. 103, 110-11 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2016).  The Bankruptcy 
Court found that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divested it of 
subject matter jurisdiction to consider a claim for the avoidance 
of the license revocation.  Id. at 111, 139.  It stated, 
the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine precludes the Trustee from 
attempting to challenge the prepetition revocation of the 
License.  The Debtor lost in state court. To the extent the 
Trustee alleges that some interest in the License inured to 
the benefit of the estate, the Trustee would be 
complaining of injuries caused by the Revocation Order 
that was subsequently confirmed by the Commonwealth 
9 
 
Opinion.  The Revocation Order and the Commonwealth 
Opinion were entered prepetition. Finally, if this Court 
was to determine that the Debtor held an interest in the 
License or some right to be compensated for its value, 
this Court would necessarily be required to review the 
merits of the earlier state court decisions. Accordingly . . 
. this Court is thereby prevented from addressing or 
otherwise modifying the prepetition revocation of the 
Debtor’s interest in the License. 
Id. at 139 (emphasis removed).   
 The Bankruptcy Court then addressed the Trustee’s claim 
for compensation for the value of the license.  The Bankruptcy 
Court stated that a claim to undo the revocation and to obtain 
compensation for the revocation are “opposite sides of the same 
coin”; that is, the right to be compensated for the value of the 
license is the “functional equivalent” of the right to retain the 
license, a conclusion that led the Court to hold that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine barred any claim for the value of the license.  
Id. at 140-41.   
 The Bankruptcy Court also addressed the fraudulent 
transfer claim by treating the relevant transfer as the 
Commonwealth’s failure to refund the license fee after the 
revocation rather than the revocation of the license.  Id. at 141-
42.  The Bankruptcy Court declined to decide whether the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred this alternative reading of the 
claim because the Commonwealth Court had not explicitly 
addressed the question of whether PEDP was entitled to a refund 
of the license fee upon the license revocation.  Id. at 142.  But 
what the Bankruptcy Court did hold was that the refund theory 
failed to state a claim under §§ 544 or 548 of the Bankruptcy 
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Code.  It concluded that PEDP’s payment of the license fee to 
the Board in October 2007 was not an actionable transfer 
because PEDP made the payment outside the statutory lookback 
periods under § 548 and the PUFTA, and the Commonwealth’s 
alleged failure to pay a refund after the revocation was not an 
actionable omission because nonpayment of property cannot be 
a transfer of property.  Id. at 152-54.  The Bankruptcy Court also 
dismissed the §§ 550 and 551 claims for recovery of the transfer 
because it believed that the adversary complaint failed to plead 
any valid avoidance claim under §§ 548 or 544.  Id. at 155.2 
                                                 
2 The Commonwealth raised an Eleventh Amendment defense in 
its pleadings which the Bankruptcy Court upheld with respect to 
state law claims that PEDP advanced in its adversary complaint 
but with which we are not concerned on this appeal.  On the 
other hand the Court did not consider that defense with respect 
to the fraudulent transfer claims that we do address.  The  
Commonwealth does not advance an Eleventh Amendment issue 
on this appeal even though the Eleventh Amendment concerns 
subject matter jurisdiction as the Commonwealth believes that, 
inasmuch as the Bankruptcy Court did not consider the defense, 
the issue had not been preserved for presentation to this Court.  
While parties cannot by consent vest a court with subject matter 
jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional, see 
Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlam Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 693 n.2 (3d 
Cir. 1996), we will not address an Eleventh Amendment issue 
on this appeal as the Commonwealth does not raise it and a party 
may waive an Eleventh Amendment defense.  See In re 
Hechinger Inv. Corp. v. Hechinger Liquidation Tr., 335 F.3d 
243, 249 (3d Cir. 1996).  We, however, express no opinion on 
whether the Commonwealth should be deemed to have waived a 
possible Eleventh Amendment defense on the remand that will 
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 PEDP appealed, but the District Court affirmed.  It held 
that the Bankruptcy Court correctly characterized the fraudulent 
transfer claims “as a challenge to the legitimacy of the 
revocation of the Debtor’s license,” and not, as the Trustee 
claimed, a “challenge only [to] the Commonwealth’s failure to 
return the value of the license after its revocation.”  In re Phila. 
Entm’t & Dev. Partners, LP, 569 B.R. 394, 399 (E.D. Pa. 2017). 
 Based on that reasoning, the District Court adopted the 
Bankruptcy Court’s Rooker-Feldman doctrine conclusions.  Id. 
at 399-400. 
 The District Court also held that the Bankruptcy Court 
correctly dismissed on the merits any part of the fraudulent 
transfer claim that application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
did not bar.  Id. at 400-01.  It held that the Bankruptcy Court 
correctly determined that PEDP’s only two transfers were the 
license fee payment in 2007 (the claim to repayment that was 
time-barred) and the loss of the license which it found occurred 
in 2012 (which claim the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred from 
review).  Id. at 401.  The District Court agreed with the 
Bankruptcy Court that there had not been a “transfer” based on 
the Commonwealth’s failure to pay PEDP $50 million after the 
revocation because nonpayment did not constitute a disposing of 
or parting with property.  Id.  The District Court entered its 
judgment on March 28, 2017.  The Trustee timely appealed. 
 
III.  STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
                                                                                                             
follow the proceedings in this Court. 
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 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction to hear the 
adversary proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b) and 1334(b).  
The District Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the 
Bankruptcy Court’s order under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).  We have 
jurisdiction of the appeal from the District Court’s order under 
28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291.  We review the Bankruptcy 
Court’s legal determinations de novo.  In re Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 145 F.3d 124, 130-31 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
 On appeal, the Trustee challenges the Bankruptcy and 
District Courts’ conclusions that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
barred their review of PEDP’s fraudulent transfer claims.  The 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives federal district and 
bankruptcy courts of jurisdiction “over suits that are essentially 
appeals from state-court judgments. . . .”  Great W. Mining & 
Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 
2010); see In re Madera, 586 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2009).  
There is some tension between the application of the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine and the prosecution of avoidance claims under 
the Bankruptcy Code as an avoidance of a claim seems to 
authorize what the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits—
appellate review of state court judgments by federal courts other 
than the Supreme Court.  See In re Knapper, 407 F.3d 573, 583 
n.22 (3d Cir. 2005) (“In apparent contradiction to Rooker-
Feldman theory, bankruptcy courts are empowered to avoid state 
judgments. . . .”) (quoting In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074, 1079 
(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).   But we have noted that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine does not necessarily bar actions that properly 
are based on the Bankruptcy Code’s fraudulent transfer statutes. 
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 See id. (rejecting “suggest[ion] that Rooker-Feldman bars an 
action that is properly based on § 544(b)(1)”).  We must decide, 
then, whether the federal courts had jurisdiction to review the 
Trustee’s fraudulent transfer claims or whether the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine barred them from doing so. 
 Our initial task is to identify the transfer on which the 
Trustee predicates its §§ 548 and 544 fraudulent transfer claims. 
 The Bankruptcy Court identified three possible transfers:  the 
payment of the license fee, the loss of the license, and the 
Commonwealth’s failure to refund the license fee.  But the 
Trustee contends that the only operative transfer for which it 
seeks relief is from the loss of the license.  Trustee’s Opening 
Br. 26 (identifying PEDP’s “transfer of the slot machine license 
upon revocation” as “the transfer on which the Fraudulent 
Transfer Claims are based”).   
 The Trustee’s position is consistent with the allegations 
in the adversary complaint that identify the license revocation as 
the operative transfer.  App’x 123 ¶ 97.3  In particular, the 
                                                 
3 Much of the Bankruptcy and District Courts’ conclusions 
regarding the two other “transfers” accordingly have no bearing 
on this appeal.  We appreciate why the Bankruptcy Court had 
difficulty pinning down with precision the fraudulent transfer 
theory of which the Trustee complains.  While the adversary 
complaint is relatively clear in asserting that the relevant transfer 
was the revocation, the Trustee’s briefs and oral arguments 
before the Bankruptcy and District Courts often conflated the 
claim with other claims in the adversary complaint that sought a 
refund of the license fee.  See, e.g., App’x 1165 (stating at oral 
argument that “any fair reading of Count One, Two, Three, and 
Four is that what we are asking for is a return of the license fee 
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Trustee does not contend that the revocation was illegal under 
the Gaming Act or violated due process of law.  Rather, it 
contends that the Bankruptcy Code’s avoidance rules imposed 
an independent obligation on the Commonwealth to pay some 
value when it revoked the license.  Trustee’s Opening Br. 18 
(“[T]he federal courts may accept as a matter of fact and law 
that the License was revoked and is lost to the Debtor; the 
question here, however, is whether, under fraudulent transfer 
law, the Commonwealth must, but failed to, pay reasonably 
equivalent value for the Debtor’s property interests which were 
transferred by way of such revocation. . . .”).  But neither the 
Bankruptcy Court nor the District Court reviewed the merits of 
that argument as they concluded that the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine barred such review.  The Trustee argues that both 
Courts erred and that the Trustee is entitled to a merits 
determination of its claim that the license revocation was a 
fraudulent transfer.  Accordingly, we turn to an analysis of that 
contention. 
 In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. the 
Supreme Court indicated that the federal courts had been 
                                                                                                             
that the transfer was the involuntary revocation of the license, 
but . . . what we’re asking to be avoided is the failure of the -- of 
the Commonwealth to repay the license fee”).  And to further 
complicate the matter, the relief for the fraudulent transfer 
claims is the value of the license, not a refund of the fee.  In 
theory, the license’s value could be measured by an amount 
differing from the fee.  But the Trustee used the $50 million 
license fee as a proxy for the value of the license.  Despite this 
confusion, we are guided by the allegations in the adversary 
complaint and will limit our discussion to the transfer as defined 
in the pleadings. 
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applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine too broadly and 
consequently it clarified that the doctrine is confined to “limited 
circumstances” where “state-court losers complain[] of injuries 
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district 
court proceedings commenced and invit[e] district court review 
and rejection of those judgments.”  544 U.S. 280, 284, 291, 125 
S.Ct. 1517, 1521-22, 1526 (2005).  In Great Western, which we 
decided after the Supreme Court decided Exxon Mobil, we said 
the doctrine applies when four requirements are met:  (1) the 
federal plaintiff lost in state court, (2) the plaintiff complains of 
injuries caused by the state-court judgment, (3) that judgment 
issued before the federal suit was filed, and (4) the plaintiff 
invites the district court to review and reject the state-court 
judgment.  Great Western, 615 F.3d at 166.  Our analysis 
focuses on the fourth requirement.4 
                                                 
4 The Trustee does not contend that the third requirement for the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply was not met, i.e., that the 
state-court judgment issued before the federal suit was filed, but 
the Trustee does make glancing arguments with respect to the 
first requirement.  It argues that PEDP, not the Trustee, was the 
plaintiff who lost in state court because the Trustee joined this 
case after the bankruptcy began and it acts on behalf of the 
estate’s creditors.  Trustee’s Opening Br. 20 (“In contesting the 
revocation of the License, the Debtor was complaining of the 
injuries it would sustain as a result of the loss of the License.  
The Trustee, in contrast, is complaining of the injuries sustained 
by the Debtor’s creditors . . . .”) (emphasis in original); Reply 
Br. 8 (“The Trustee does not stand in the pre-petition Debtor’s 
shoes in pursuing the Fraudulent Transfer Claims.”).  The 
District Court rejected this argument, App’x 8.  But we need not 
reach this question because we find that the Trustee’s claim does 
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 By asking the Bankruptcy Court to find that the license 
revocation was an avoidable fraudulent transfer, the Trustee did 
not invite that Court to “review and reject” the revocation order. 
 See Great Western, 615 F.3d at 166.  The “review and reject” 
requirement concerns whether the federal court must conduct 
“prohibited appellate review” of state-court decisions.  Id. at 
169.  “Prohibited appellate review” means “a review of the 
proceedings already conducted by the ‘lower’ tribunal to 
determine whether it reached its result in accordance with law.” 
 Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).   
 Such a prohibited review differs from mere “attempts to 
litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated in state 
court. . . .”  Id. (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293, 125 
S.Ct. at 1527).  When the plaintiff attempts to litigate previously 
litigated matters, the federal court has jurisdiction “as long as 
the ‘federal plaintiff present[s] some independent claim,’ even if 
that claim denies a legal conclusion reached by the state court.”  
Id. (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293, 125 S.Ct. at 1527) 
(internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original).  In 
other words, if the federal court’s review does not concern “the 
bona fides of the prior judgment,” the federal court “is not 
conducting appellate review, regardless of whether compliance 
with the second judgment would make it impossible to comply 
with the first judgment.”  Id. (internal citation and quotation 
marks omitted).  In that situation, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
would not apply because the plaintiff is not “complaining of 
legal injury caused by a state court judgment because of a legal 
error committed by the state court.”  Id. (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted). 
                                                                                                             
not come within the fourth requirement for the doctrine to bar 
this action. 
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 The Trustee’s fraudulent transfer claims did not ask the 
Bankruptcy Court to make an appellate review of the revocation 
order.  The Commonwealth Court considered whether the Board 
had authority under the Gaming Act to revoke the slot machine 
license due to PEDP’s noncompliance with the Board’s orders, 
and whether the requirements were sufficiently clear and 
afforded due process to the licensee during the revocation 
proceedings.  The Bankruptcy Court did not need to consider the 
bona fides of that decision or review the Commonwealth Court 
proceedings, and the Trustee does not argue that the Bankruptcy 
Court should make such a review.  Rather, the Bankruptcy Court 
could have started from the premise that the Board and 
Commonwealth Court reached the correct result under state law. 
 The Court then could have decided whether that revocation, 
which occurred because of valid state proceedings, could 
nonetheless be avoided under the Bankruptcy Code.  To decide 
that question, the Bankruptcy Court should have determined if 
the revocation of the license was a fraudulent transfer, i.e., it 
should have considered whether PEDP had an interest in the 
license, transferred it within the lookback period, became 
insolvent as a result of the transfer, and did not receive 
reasonably equivalent value in return for the transfer.  See In re 
Fruehauf Trailer Corp., 444 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(listing elements of constructive fraudulent transfer claim).  The 
Bankruptcy Court could have answered these questions without 
rejecting or even reviewing the Commonwealth Court’s 
decision.  And, if it accepted the Trustee’s argument, the 
Bankruptcy Court would have concluded that the Bankruptcy 
Code permitted avoidance of the transfer, not that the 
Commonwealth Court had committed legal error.5   
                                                 
5 When we say that the Bankruptcy Court would have permitted 
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 We recognize, as did the Bankruptcy Court, that the 
fraudulent transfer claims and the claims before the 
Commonwealth Court raised overlapping legal issues.  But that 
circumstance did not mean that the Bankruptcy Court was 
required to reject or even review the Commonwealth’s order for 
the Bankruptcy Court to decide whether the license revocation 
was a fraudulent transfer.  Consider, for example, the 
overlapping question of interest in the license.  In deciding that 
the Board had authority to revoke the license, the 
Commonwealth Court considered whether PEDP had an interest 
in the license of which PEDP could not be deprived without due 
process of law.  Phila. Entm’t & Dev. Partners, 34 A.3d at 276.  
The Bankruptcy Court held, however, that if it “was to 
determine that the Debtor held an interest in the License . . . this 
Court would necessarily be required to review the merits of the 
earlier state court decisions.”  In re Phila. Entm’t & Dev. 
Partners, 549 B.R. at 139.  The Bankruptcy Court, however, did 
not explain why if it made that determination it would have been 
required to review the merits of the Commonwealth Court 
decision, and we see no reason why it would have had to have 
done so.     
 The state and federal courts would address the similar 
question of property interest, but the Bankruptcy Court would 
not need to review the Commonwealth Court’s decision to reach 
its conclusion.  The Bankruptcy Court instead would apply its 
independent reading of the law governing whether PEDP had an 
interest in the license.  That inquiry would not have implicated 
                                                                                                             
avoidance of the transfer we mean only that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine did not bar the Court from finding that there 
had been a fraudulent transfer.  We are not expressing an 
opinion on the merits of the claim. 
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the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  As we explained in Great 
Western, a federal court can address the same issue “and reach[] 
a conclusion contrary to a judgment by the first court,” as long 
as the federal court does not reconsider the legal conclusion 
reached by the state court.  Great Western, 615 F.3d at 169. 
 Our above conclusion brings us to the next question, 
which concerns the relief requested by the Trustee.  In the 
adversary complaint, PEDP prayed for payment by the 
Commonwealth of the full value of the transfer.  App’x 123 ¶ 
104, 125 ¶ 114.6  The Bankruptcy Court held that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine barred review of the fraudulent transfer claim 
because payment for the value of the license was the functional 
equivalent to invalidating the state court decision.  We again 
disagree.  Because the fraudulent transfer claim in the 
Bankruptcy Court was independent of the Gaming Act and due 
process claims previously advanced in the state court, it does not 
matter for Rooker-Feldman doctrine purposes that the relief that 
                                                 
6 The Trustee does not contend that the Board should reissue the 
slot machine license to PEDP.  The Trustee’s sole argument in 
terms of remedy is that the Commonwealth must pay for the 
value of the license.  See, e.g., Trustee’s Opening Br. 4 (“As a 
result [of the fraudulent transfer], the Trustee is entitled to 
recover the value of the Debtor’s transferred interests in the 
License for the benefit of the Debtor’s creditors.”); id. 12 
(“[T]he Trustee challenged the dismissal of the Fraudulent 
Transfer Claims on the basis that the Bankruptcy Court 
fundamentally misconstrued the Trustee’s claims and improperly 
conflated the state court revocation proceedings with the 
Trustee’s claim that no value was payed [sic] for the Debtor’s 
property interests which were transferred through revocation of 
the Debtor’s License.”). 
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the Trustee sought, if granted, would frustrate the 
Commonwealth Court’s order.  See Great Western, 615 F.3d at 
169 (finding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine inapplicable to 
independent claims “regardless of whether compliance with the 
second judgment would make it impossible to comply with the 
first judgment”). 
 In reaching its contrary conclusion, the Bankruptcy Court 
relied on Maple Lanes, Inc. v. Messer, 186 F.3d 823 (7th Cir. 
1999).  But we conclude that that case is unpersuasive given the 
Supreme Court’s refinements to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
after the court of appeals decided Maple Lanes.  In that case, the 
plaintiff, Maple Lanes, lost its liquor license after the local 
sheriff told a newspaper that there had been drug sales in its 
liquor store.  Maple Lanes unsuccessfully challenged the 
revocation in a state court.  Maple Lanes then sued the sheriff in 
federal court for defamation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  It alleged 
that his statement caused the city to revoke its license and it 
sought as damages the monetary value of the license.  The court 
of appeals dismissed the complaint pursuant to the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine as it held that the federal claim was an end-run 
around the revocation:  “In essence, Maple Lanes seeks to undo 
the effects of the revocation of its liquor license by collecting an 
amount of damages from [the sheriff] . . . equal to the monetary 
value of the license.”  Id. at 825.  The court stated that “[i]f a 
federal court were to award the relief,” the “result would 
effectively reverse the state court judgment upholding the 
revocation of the liquor license.  There is little difference 
between awarding Maple Lanes the monetary value of the 
license and the license itself.”  Id. at 826.   
 In our view, the result in Maple Lanes does not comport 
with the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as it now is understood.  The 
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court of appeals decided Maple Lanes several years before the 
Supreme Court decided Exxon Mobil and a decade before we 
decided Great Western.  It is clear that both Exxon Mobil and 
Great Western call the reasoning in Maple Lanes into question.7 
 In particular, Maple Lanes focused on the effect of the relief 
i.e., that damages would functionally “undo the effect of the 
revocation” even though the revocation order would still be 
valid, but it did not address whether the federal court in making 
its adjudication needed to review the state court decision for 
legal error.  The focus, we now know, should be the other way 
around.  That is, the crux of a Rooker-Feldman doctrine inquiry 
is whether it requires the federal court to look at the “bona fides 
of the prior judgment,” not whether “compliance with the 
second judgment would make it impossible to comply with the 
first judgment.”  Great Western, 615 F.3d at 169.  Thus, contrary 
to Maple Lanes’ reasoning, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does 
not apply merely because the claim for relief if granted would as 
a practical matter undermine a valid state court order.  
Accordingly, we respectfully disagree with the holding in Maple 
Lanes and so, too, with the Bankruptcy Court’s reliance upon it.  
 The same reasoning undoes the Bankruptcy Court’s last 
conclusion.  To support its argument that payment for the value 
of the license was the functional equivalent of returning the 
license, the Bankruptcy Court discussed apparently 
contradictory legal positions in the state and federal 
proceedings.  The Bankruptcy Court noted that the Board and 
Commonwealth Court accepted PEDP’s argument that it would 
not recoup any money after the revocation; but the Trustee now 
                                                 
7 We are not suggesting that Great Western if decided before 
Maple Lanes would have been binding on the Maple Lanes 
court. 
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claims a right to payment for the license because of the 
revocation.  In re Phila. Entm’t & Dev. Partners, 549 B.R. at 
141.  The Commonwealth keys in on this point as well, arguing 
that “it was clear to all involved in those proceedings that 
revocation of PEDP’s license would not entitle PEDP to return 
of any portion of its $50 million license fee. . . .”  
Commonwealth’s Br. 19.  But even if the Trustee has taken 
inconsistent positions before the different tribunals, “attempts 
merely to relitigate an issue determined in a state case are 
properly analyzed under issue or claim preclusion principles 
rather than Rooker-Feldman.”  In re Miller, 666 F.3d 1255, 1261 
(10th Cir. 2012).    
 In sum, the Trustee is not “complaining of an injury 
caused by the state-court judgment and seeking review and 
rejection of that judgment.”  Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291, 125 
S.Ct. at 1526.  The Bankruptcy Court applied the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine too broadly in finding that the fraudulent 
transfer claims require the federal courts to void the state court 
order.  Accordingly, we conclude that the Bankruptcy Court 
erred in holding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred it from 
considering the Trustee’s fraudulent transfer claims, and we will 
reverse its grant of dismissal as to Counts Two, Three, and Four 
of the adversary complaint.8 
 Usually, the final step in a Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
                                                 
8 Because we find that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not 
bar review of the Trustee’s claims, we will not reach the 
Trustee’s alternative argument that the doctrine never can apply 
when the Bankruptcy Court is enforcing substantive provisions 
of the Bankruptcy Code.  Trustee’s Opening Br. 21-25.  
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analysis is to “apply state law to determine the preclusive effect 
of the prior state-court judgments.”  Great Western, 615 F.3d at 
173.  Although the Commonwealth raised issue preclusion 
issues before the Bankruptcy Court, that Court did not address 
the argument and neither party has raised those issues on this 
appeal.  And although the parties have briefed the merits of the 
fraudulent transfer claims, the Commonwealth focused, as had 
the Bankruptcy and District Courts, on whether a fraudulent 
transfer claim arises from the payment of the license fee or the 
refund, not the revocation of the license itself as urged by the 
Trustee—a result likely attributable to the unclear nature of the 
Trustee’s claims, as we explained above.  It is not surprising, 
therefore, that we do not have adequate briefing on the 
preclusion issues.  Accordingly, we will remand this matter to 
the District Court to address inter alia (1) whether claim or issue 
preclusion bars judicial review of the Trustee’s claim that the 
license revocation was a constructively fraudulent transfer under 
§ 548(a)(1)(B) or § 544(b) and the PUFTA; and if not (2) 
whether the Trustee has stated a claim that the license 
revocation constitutes a fraudulent transfer under § 548(a)(1)(B) 
or § 544(b) and the PUFTA; and (3) whether the Eleventh 
Amendment bars judicial review of the Trustee’s claim that the 
license revocation was a constructively fraudulent transfer under 
§ 548(a)(1)(B) or § 544(b) and the PUFTA. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s affirmance of the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of the 
Trustee’s fraudulent transfer claims in Counts Two, Three, and 
Four of the adversary complaint, which the Bankruptcy Court 
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predicated on its belief that the federal courts lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over the claims.  We will remand the case for 
further proceedings to the District Court which, at its option, 
may decide the remaining issues that come before it on the 
remand or may, in turn, remand the matter to the Bankruptcy 
Court for further proceedings. 
 
